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Canadian Police and
Peace Officers’ 37th
Annual Memorial Service
Le 37e service commémoratif
des policiers et agents
de la paix canadiens
September 28, 2014
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
Le 28 septembre 2014
Colline du Parlement
Ottawa (Ontario)
Photo: Harry De Jong
For more on the 
2014            
British Columbia 
Law Enforcement 
Memorial         
see pages 32-34.
“They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.”
Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings Ottawa, Ontario.
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Highlights In This Issue
Conference: Radicalization Of Terrorists 4
Security Guard Private Actor: Charter Did Not 
Apply To search
6
s. 489(2) CC Does Not Require Unrelate Purpose 10
Documents In Possession Used As Circumstantial 
Evidence: Not Inadmissible Hearsay
11
All Circumstances To Be Considered In Reasonable 
Grounds Determination
12
Reasonable Suspicion: Each Circumstance Not To Be 
Considered Separately
15
911 Entry Justified: Cursory Search Justified In 
Circumstances
18
Officer Safety Rendered Detention & Search Lawful 19
Marihuana Odour Sufficient To Justify Arrest 22
Penile Swab Unreasonable As An Incident To Arrest 24
Terms Of Contract Negated Privacy Interest In 
Package
27
Incidental Pat-Down Reasonable, But Search Of Flash 
Drive Not
29
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Events
Human	 Source	 Management
This course will equip participants with the basic skills 
required and the best practices to follow associated 
with the recruitment and handling  of informants and 
agents . I t includes preparat ion of judicial 
authorizations utilizing informant / agent information, 
policy and how to effectively report on information 
derived from these assets. 
September	 16-19,	 2014
JIBC	 Police	 Academy	 Advanced	 Training
www.jibc.ca/course/POLADV715 
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
BCACP/CACP
2015	 Police	 Leadership	 Conference
April	 12-14,	 2015
“Leading	 with	 Vision	 and	 Values”
This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference providing  an opportunity for delegates 
to hear leadership  topics discussed by world-
renowned speakers. Click here
see 
page  
40
BCLEDN	 Conference
November	 5,	 2014
“Radicalization	 of	 Terrorists”	 
see 
page 
4
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The 5 languages of appreciation in the 
workplace:  empowering  organizations by 
encouraging people.
Gary D. Chapman, Paul E. White.
Chicago, IL: Northfield Pub., c2012.
HF 5549.5 M63 C438 2012
Be more than a bystander [videorecording]:  break the 
silence on violence against women.
Vancouver, BC: Ending  Violence Association of BC, 
c2014.
1 videodisc (20 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Produced by the Ending Violence Association of BC 
and the BC Lions Football Club. Looks at violence 
against women through the lens of an initiative 
between the Ending Violence Association of BC and the 
BC Lions Football Club. It examines what gender 
violence is, why people should get involved and what 
being "more than a bystander" means.
HV 6250.4 W65 B4 2014 D1974
Becoming  a strategic leader: your role in your 
organization's enduring success.
Richard L. Hughes, Katherine Colarelli Beatty, David 
L. Dinwoodie.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2014.
HD 57.7 H84 2014
Brain boosting secrets [videorecording]: 16 things you 
must know about your brain.
Terry Small.
Surrey, BC: Terry Small, c2011.
1 videodisc (96 min.) : sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Terry Small shares his plan to boost your brain power, 
improve your thinking, and optimize your brain and 
body health for the rest of your life. He covers the 
following: how to eat right and think right; how to get 
rid of negative thoughts; the #1 food for your brain; 
how to improve your reading skills; how to sharpen 
your memory; how to outwit Alzheimer's; the 3 things 
every brain must have; and more.
QP 376 S63 2011 D1991
Brain power: improve your mind as you age.
Michael J. Gelb and Kelly Howell; foreword by Tony 
Buzan.
Novato, CA: New World Library, c2012.
BF 724.55 C63 G45 2012
Leaders eat last: why some teams pull together 
and others don't.
Simon Sinek.
New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, c2014.
HD 57.7 S548 2014
Leading change.
John P. Kotter.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, c2012.
HD 58.8 K65 2012
Leading  with questions: how leaders find the 
right solutions by knowing what to ask.
Michael J. Marquardt.
San Francisco, CA : Jossey-Bass, c2014.
HD 57.7 M392 2014
Power over stress: 35 quick prescriptions for 
mastering the stress in your life.
Kenford Nedd.
Toronto, ON: QP Press, 2003.
RA 785 N42 2003
The practical coach 2 [videorecording].
Seattle, WA: Media Partners Corp., c2014.
1 videodisc (ca. 25 min.)  : sd., col. ;  4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 CD-
ROM.
DVD also contains the leader's guide (PDF format; 
requires a computer that has a DVD drive and Adobe 
Acrobat Reader software), previews, and contact 
information; CD-ROM also contains the leader's guide. 
Takes managers step-by-step through the three most 
critical times for performance intervention. Covers the 
following: coaching  on personal habits and hygiene; 
avoiding  employee's defensive sidetracks; and positive 
ways to reward and encourage peak performance
HF 5549 P73 2014 D1971
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BCLEDN
BC Law En forcement D ivers i t y Net work
Nov. 5th, 2014 from 9am to 4pm @ The Justice Institute of BC
Registration from 8am to 8:45am • Pre-register at www.bcledn.org 
$175 (before or on Sept 30) and $225 (after September 30)
Attendance Restricted to Law Enforcement Personnel Only
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Dr. Martin Bouchard
Associate Professor of 
Criminology & Director of 
the International Cyber 
Crime Research Centre 
(SFU) and Associate 
Director of Research of 
TSAS. Bouchard will present 
on the role of social 
networks connected to 
illegal markets, organized 
crime & more specifically, 
terrorism.
Dr. Lorne L. Dawson
Chair of the Department 
of Sociology and Legal 
Studies at the University 
of Waterloo and Professor 
in the Department of 
Sociology and Legal 
Studies and Department 
of Religious Studies. 
Dawson will discuss the 
process of radicalization 
in homegrown terrorists 
groups. 
Mubin Shaikh
Coming from a 
background of having 
been a Muslim extremist in 
earlier years to becoming 
an undercover operative 
in several high profile 
classified cases. Shaikh 
will provide an extremely 
unique perspective 
on radicalization and 
recruitment as it relates to 
society today.
Insp. Steve Corcoran  
Operations Officer for 
the E Division National 
Security Enforcement 
Team (INSET) and active 
member of the National 
Security Program for 
over 11 years. Corcoran 
brings a local and 
front-line perspective on 
homegrown terrorism and 
radicalization.
The BC LEDN is a sub-committee of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police with representation from the following participating agencies.
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LACK	 OF	 RGB	 DOES	 NOT	 
RENDER	 PRESUMPTION	 OF	 
IDENTITY	 INAPPLICABLE
R. v. Anderson, 2013 QCCA 2160
Police officers observed a  vehicle late 
at night being  driven by someone not 
wearing  a  seat belt. They decided to 
stop  the vehicle, which was moving 
quickly as if the driver was trying  to 
f l e e . A f t e r losing  sight of the vehicle, the police 
officers spotted it parked diagonally across a parking 
spot. When an officer spoke to the  accused about 
not wearing  his seat belt, he was somewhat 
aggressive. The officer noted a strong  odour of 
alcohol on his breath. The accused did not answer 
routine questions, appeared to be “stoned,” fumbled 
as he took out his papers, his movements were slow 
and his were eyes glassy. He was arrested and given 
a breathalyzer demand. He subsequently provided 
two breath samples of 141mg% and 142mg%.  
Court of Quebec
The judge found the stop lawful under 
Quebec’s Highway Safety  Code because 
of the viewed seat belt violation. 
However, the  judge ruled that the police 
violated the accused’s rights by arresting  him. 
Although the officer had the requisite subjective 
belief and enough grounds for an ASD demand, 
there  were insufficient grounds that the accused was 
impaired and therefore not enough grounds for a 
breathalyzer test. Nevertheless, the judge admitted 
the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2). The judge 
rejected the accused’s argument that the 
presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)  of the 
Criminal Code did not apply without evidence there 
were reasonable grounds to believe that an offence 
had been committed. The judge found the absence 
of reasonable grounds was relevant to the s. 24(2) 
inquiry but, once an accused complied with the 
demand and the breath samples were ruled 
admissible, the accused was in the same position 
under s. 258(1)(c) as someone whose rights have not 
been violated. The certificate of analysis was 
admissible, the  presumption of identity applied and 
a conviction of over 80mg% followed.  
Quebec Superior Court
The accused appealed arguing  that the 
trial judge failed to properly weigh the s. 
24(2)  factors. These arguments were 
rejected. Recognizing  that the relevant s. 
24(2)  factors were analyzed, the  appeal judge 
accorded considerable deference to the trial judge's 
decision and concluded it was reasonable. He also 
opined that the presumption of identity still applied 
even in the absence of reasonable grounds for the 
breath demand.  
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused again appealed his 
conviction arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the presumption of 
identity  in s. 258(1)(c)  did not 
apply if, at the time of the arrest, the officer did not 
have reasonable grounds to believe that he was 
committing  or had committed an offence under s. 
253 (impaired driving/over 80mg%). 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Drug Business
“In the drug business, loyalty and 
integrity are important.  At every 
step along the way.  Wholesalers.  
Brokers.  Retailers.  Street dealers.  
Everyone has their role. And everyone gets their due, 
their full due.  No one gets short-changed.  And no one 
gets cut out. Sometimes, however, loyalty and 
integrity get left behind.  Forgotten. Ignored.  
Payments are short.  Deliveries are light.  Brokers are 
cut out.  Retailers deal directly with wholesalers.  
Disloyalty has its price.  And sometimes that price is 
very steep.  As here.  One death, a murder.” – Ontario 
Court of Appeal Justice Watt in R. v. Saleh, 2013 ONCA 
742 at paras. 1-3.  
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s. 258(1)(c) Criminal Code
Section 258(1)(c)  establishes a presumption of 
identity  and relieves the Crown from having  to prove 
that the accused’s blood alcohol content (BAC) at the 
time of the offence was the same as at the time of 
testing. Using  the presumption of identity, the 
accused’s BAC at the time of the breathalyzer test is 
presumed to be the same as their BAC at the time of 
the alleged offence provided the breath samples 
were taken in compliance with the provisions of s. 
254(3). Absent this presumption, the Crown is 
required to prove that the results represent the BAC 
at the time of the offence, likely through expert 
evidence.
Following  the Supreme Court of Canada decision R. 
v. Rilling, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 183  (even though decided 
prior to the Charter), the Quebec Court of Appeal 
stated:
[T]he lack of reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that an individual's ability to drive is 
impaired by alcohol does not mean that the 
incriminating  cert i f icate of analysis is 
inadmissible if the driver complies with the 
breathalyzer demand. In other words, it is not 
necessary to prove reasonable and probable 
grounds for the presumptions in the Code to 
apply. [para. 42]
If breath samples are obtained without reasonable 
grounds for the demand, the evidence may be 
excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. However, if 
the samples are ruled admissible under s. 24(2), the 
presumption of identity continues to apply:
In my opinion, the trial judge was correct in 
saying that when a motion to exclude evidence 
is dismissed, [translation] “the accused is in the 
same situation as an accused who has not 
invoked the Charter, and Rilling applies. The 
certificate of analysis is admissible in evidence, 
and the presumptions apply”.
The logical outcome of admit t ing the 
breathalyzer evidence is the application of the 
presumption of identity.
To find otherwise would indirectly undermine 
the still-applicable principles in Rilling  and 
considerably reduce the effect of the judgment 
rendered under subsection 24(2) of the 
Charter. [paras. 49-51]
In this case, the accused’s motion to exclude the 
Certificate of Analysis under s. 24(2) was dismissed. 
Since he complied with the breathalyzer demand 
and the evidence was ruled admissible, the absence 
of reasonable grounds did not render the 
presumption of identity inapplicable.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SECURITY	 GUARD	 PRIVATE	 
ACTOR:	 CHARTER	 DID	 NOT	 
APPLY	 TO	 SEARCH
R. v. Jacobs, 2014 ABCA 172
The accused and her companion 
approached a security checkpoint at 
t h e e n t r a n c e t o a s u m m e r 
exhibition. A security guard asked if 
he could search the accused’s purse. 
The accused consented by placing  her purse on the 
table in front of him. Inside, the security guard 
observed a closed cigarette  package. When he asked 
about its contents, the accused’s voice quivered, her 
hands shook and she  pulled the cigarette  package 
away. The security  guard took it back and opened 
the package. In it he found a white powder which 
appeared to him to be “some form of illicit drug.” 
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The security guard called over a police officer to 
show her what he had discovered. The officer pulled 
the drugs out of the cigarette  package, immediately 
arrested the accused, searched her purse and found 
three  bundles of cash. Laboratory analysis later 
confirmed the contents as being  13  individually 
wrapped packages of soft cocaine weighing  2.4 
grams, and 14 individually wrapped packages of 
hard or crack cocaine weighing 2.3 grams.
Alberta Provincial Court
          
The Crown argued that the security guard 
was not acting  as an agent of the state 
when he searched the accused’s purse and 
therefore the search was not subject to 
Charter scrutiny. The accused, to the contrary, 
submitted that the security guard, as an experienced 
former police officer, was acting  as an agent of the 
state, essentially working  as an extension of the 
authority conferred upon the police officer, who 
had been assigned to work with the security guards 
and was present throughout.
The judge  ruled that the security guard was acting  in 
a private capacity and therefore his actions were not 
subject to s. 8 Charter scrutiny. The judge, relying  on 
expert drug  evidence, then convicted the accused of 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and 
two counts of failing  to comply with release 
conditions. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appea led he r 
convictions arguing, among  other 
things, that the trial judge erred in 
finding  that the Charter did not 
apply to the search that led to the discovery of the 
cocaine. In her view, the security  guard was acting 
as an agent of the  police, being  implicitly authorized 
or requested by police to search entrants. The 
security guard was a former police officer who relied 
on his police training, the police had been hired as 
extra security at the event and were present at the 
site, and an officer was positioned close to the 
security guard at the checkpoint.
State Actor?
The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge that the security guard was acting  in a  private 
capacity and not as a  state agent. Here, the police 
officer had not been involved in the search until the 
drugs were discovered. Although the officer’s 
presence at the time of the search raised the 
possibility that police influenced how the security 
guard conducted the  search, mere possibility of 
influence was insufficient to prove actual influence:
[T]there is no evidence before us to suggest that the 
police exercised influence over whether or how to 
conduct [the security guard’s] search. There was 
evidence before the trial judge that it was 
Northlands’ policy to search some entrants to 
Capital EX for weapons or drugs that would pose a 
risk to the safety or health of other patrons. While 
police officers were contracted to assist in 
implementing that policy, Northlands required no 
authority or instruction from the police to search 
entrants to Northlands’ premises. [The security 
guard] testified that he decided to search the 
[accused] and her companion because they were 
carrying what he considered to be “very large” 
purses ... . On the evidence before us, the 
unavoidable conclusion is that the [accused’s] purse 
would have been searched in the manner it was 
searched, irrespective of police presence. We are 
not swayed from this conclusion by [the security 
guard’s] reliance on his past police training and 
experience in conducting the search. Indeed, it 
would have made sense for Northlands to retain 
someone with that professional background to 
promote security checkpoint searches that are both 
effective and efficient. [para. 33]
This ground of appeal was dismissed. A new trial 
was ordered, however, on the basis that the trial 
judge erred in admitting  the opinion evidence of 
trafficking.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
If you are interested in past issues of In-Service: 
10-8 or would like to be added to its email 
distribution list, go to:
www.10-8.ca
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 JUDGE	 NEED	 NOT	 ENTERTAIN	 
IMPLAUSIBLE	 CONJECTURE
R. v. Polley, 2014 NSCA 71
A van seen driven erratically left the 
highway, rolled over several times 
and ended up in a ditch.  Witnesses 
described seeing  two male occupants, 
one driving  the van and the other 
seated in the right front passenger seat.  One man 
(the accused’s brother-in-law) was observed get out 
of the front passenger seat while the accused (the 
van owner and a prohibited driver)  was found lying 
on the  ground about 60 feet from the vehicle, 
apparently  knocked out but still alive. Both men 
emitted a strong  smell of alcohol. The accused was 
charged with over 80mg%, impaired driving, driving 
while disqualified and dangerous driving.
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
At trial the accused did not testify nor call 
any evidence.  His brother-in-law said he 
could not recall who was driving  the van 
at the time of the crash.  Witnesses 
identified the brother-in-law as the man they saw 
seated in and getting  out of the  right front passenger 
seat, using  the passenger side door.  Police 
photographs taken later showed what was described 
as a seatbelt rash on the brother-in-law’s right 
shoulder and several cuts to his right arm and hand.  
The judge convicted the accused of impaired 
driving, dangerous driving, and driving  while 
disqualified.  He was sentenced to five years in 
prison.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the judge  was wrong  to conclude 
that his brother-in-law was the 
passenger and deduce that he was 
the driver. He suggested that his brother-in-law 
could have been driving  but ended up in the 
passenger seat due to the forces of physics The 
accused claimed that when the van rolled over he 
could have  been ejected from the passenger seat and 
thrown through the windshield. 
Justice Saunders, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
rejected this alternative theory  as “implausible 
conjecture”:
Respectfully, such an hypothesis  cannot be 
seriously advanced.  There is nothing in this 
record to offer even the remotest support for the 
[accused’s] fanciful suggestions. To embark upon 
such idle speculation would constitute legal 
error.  A reasonable doubt based upon an 
i n f e r ence un suppo r t ed by f ac t s i s a 
misapplication of the law.  [para. 18]
She continued:
[T]he Crown was able to establish a strong 
circumstantial case based upon the following 
facts. The van and the scene of the crash were 
littered with cans and bottles which had once (or 
still) contained alcohol. Both men had a strong 
smell of alcohol on their breath suggesting that 
each had been drinking before or at the time of 
the crash.  The [accused] was found lying 
shirtless and unconscious in the woods some 60 
feet away from where the van came to rest. His 
brother-in-law ... was seen seated in the right 
front passenger seat and getting  out of the van 
using  that passenger side door.  He was wearing 
a bloodied white t-shirt and had many 
lacerations to his right arm and hand, which he 
could not explain.  Photographs taken by the 
police showed blood on the inside of the right 
front passenger door and armrest.  Such 
evidence, when taken together, would certainly 
be enough to lead [the trial judge] to the 
perfectly rational and logical conclusion that the 
[accused] was driving  the van when it left the 
highway and that he was drunk at the time. 
It was not the trial judge’s responsibility to 
reconstruct how this mishap occurred or explain 
the occupants’ kinesics during  the crash with 
scientific certainty. His obligation was to decide 
whether the Crown had proved all essential 
elements of the offences charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. He did exactly that. He stated 
and applied the law correctly.  He did not 
misconstrue or ignore material evidence.  He 
made strong  findings of fact.  He drew 
reasonable inferences from those facts.  He 
carefully reviewed the important evidence and 
provided clear and cogent reasons to explain the 
basis for his conclusions. [paras. 23-24]
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The judge made sound factual findings and 
inferences, properly applied the law to the evidence 
and his analysis and conclusions were fully 
supported. The accused’s appeal against conviction 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DUAL	 PURPOSE	 STOP	 LAWFUL:	 
DRIVING	 OFFENCE	 WITNESSED
R. v. Hugh, 2014 BCSC 1426
Marihuana Enforcement Team officers 
carried out an investigation and 
obtained search warrants for a leased 
commercial property as well as a 
residence. Part of the grounds for the 
search warrant involved a uniform officer executing 
a traffic stop  at the request of investigators doing 
covert surveillance. The uniformed officer was told 
over the radio that the occupant of a vehicle had 
been driving  poorly and was making  lane changes 
without signalling. He did not know the specific 
lane changes or the location of them. The uniformed 
officer was able catch up  to a black BMW, 
confirmed with investigators that it was the correct 
vehicle and that it had made lane changes without 
signalling. He activated his emergency lights and the 
BMW pulled over. After being  told that he was being 
stopped for making  lane changes without signalling, 
the accused (driver) told the  officer that he had 
answered a call on his cell phone while driving. He 
was issued a ticket for driving  with an electronic 
device. The request for the traffic stop was not 
disclosed in the ITO. As a result of the investigation 
and search warrants, the accused was charged with 
production of marihuana and two counts of 
possessing marihuana for the purposes of trafficking.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The search warrant affiant and member of 
the covert surveillance team testified the 
plan was to complete a dual‑purpose 
traffic stop  to identify the accused if “a 
moving  motor vehicle violation was observed”. He 
testified he saw the accused make a left turn and a 
lane change without signalling, at which point the 
uniformed officer conducted the stop. 
The accused argued that the dual‑purpose traffic 
stop  required "a  legitimate  concern for public safety 
authorized by traffic legislation," but there was no 
danger to the public. In his view, the traffic stop  was 
unlawful and the information derived from it should 
have been excised from the ITO. The Crown, on the 
other hand, submitted that as long  as the traffic 
offence was legitimately witnessed, the dominant 
purpose for the stop (such as identifying  the driver)
was irrelevant.
Justice Schultes agreed with the Crown. The 
investigator saw a lane change in violation of British 
Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)  and relayed this 
to the uniformed officer. Changing  lanes without 
signalling  under s. 151(c) MVA does not require that 
the public be endangered. This was not the same as 
a stop being  a mere ruse or saying  the offence did 
not occur. The fact a ticket was issued for a different 
offence also did not render the  stop unlawful. The 
officer, after speaking  to the accused, exercised 
“independent judgment by looking  into the causes 
of the violation of which he had been informed, and 
not acting as a mere tool of the drug investigators.”
There was no Charter breach with regard to the stop. 
The judge did, however, note the police were less 
than candid in leaving  the impression that the 
vehicle was stopped for a purpose entirely unrelated 
to the investigation. The search warrant was upheld 
and the evidence was admissible even though there 
were other problems with it. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BY THE BOOK:
British	 Columbia’s	 Motor Vehicle Act
Signals on Turning
s. 151 (c) A driver who is driving a vehicle on a 
laned roadway 
...
(c) must not drive it from one lane to another without first 
signalling his or her intention to do so by hand and arm or 
approved mechanical device ... .
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s.	 489(2)	 CC	 DOES	 NOT	 REQUIRE	 
UNRELATED	 PURPOSE
R. v. R.M.J.T., 2014 MBCA 36   
 
During  an investigation into sexual 
offence allegations, the police 
approached the accused’s wife (and 
complainant’s mother)  and requested 
her consent for the seizure of the 
accused’s computer. The wife agreed and officers 
attended the family home, were shown the 
computer and seized it. Police subsequently 
obtained a warrant to search the computer (and 
other items seized)  and found fragments of sexually 
explicit emails in nature on the computer. The 
accused was subsequently  charged with sexual 
assault, sexual interference, voyeurism (surreptitious 
recording), making  child pornography, possessing 
child pornography, extortion and inviting  sexual 
touching.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the seizures of the 
computer by police did not infringe  the 
accused’s s. 8  Charter rights. As for the 
computer, he noted that the mother did 
not have the authority to consent to the computer’s 
seizure. However, the mother lawfully consented to 
the police entry to her home and the warrantless 
seizure of the computer was then justified under s. 
489(2) of the Criminal Code. The judge also ruled 
that, even if there was a s. 8 breach, the evidence 
was admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of several sex-related offences. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused appea l ed h i s 
convictions arguing, among  other 
things, that the  computer seizure 
was not authorized under s. 489(2) 
and therefore breached of s. 8. 
He contended the application of s. 489(2)  to the 
seizure of the computer was unconstitutional for 
three reasons:
1. The police entered his house specifically to 
seize  his computer. He suggested that the 
seizing  officer must be engaged in a lawful 
activity for a purpose unrelated to the seizure.
 
2. The police entered his home unlawfully. The 
mother could not consent to police entering 
and searching  for the computer prior to 
seizing it.
3. The reasonable grounds requirements of s. 
489(2)  were not satisfied. There was no 
evidence that the police officers subjectively 
believed that the computer had been used in 
the commission of an offence or would afford 
evidence in respect of the  commission of an 
offence, nor did police say they were relying 
on s. 489(2).
The Crown submitted that the trial judge 
appropriately applied the legislation and noted the 
police obtained a warrant before searching  the 
computer’s contents (where the expectation of 
privacy was notably high).
BY THE BOOK:
Seizure	 without	 warrant: Criminal Code
s. 489(2) Every peace officer, and every public 
officer who has been appointed or designated 
to administer or enforce any federal or 
provincial law and whose duties include the 
enforcement of this or any other Act of 
Parliament, who is lawfully present in a place pursuant to a 
warrant or otherwise in the execution of duties may, without 
a warrant, seize any thing that the officer believes on 
reasonable grounds
(a)  has been obtained by the commission of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament;
(b) has been used in the commission of an offence against 
this or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an offence against this 
or any other Act of Parliament.
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(Un)related Purpose?
In rejecting  the accused’s first argument, Justice 
Cameron, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
reviewed the case law and made the following 
observations about s. 489(2):
• Its purpose is the preservation of evidence.  
• It is a self-contained provision that does not 
require the seizing  officer to meet all of the 
requirements of the plain view doctrine.
• Unlike the plain view doctrine, it is not 
necessary  for the  evidence seized to have 
been discovered in the course of a search in 
an unrelated investigation.
• The place of seizure alone (whether a private 
home or public place)  does not render the 
provision unconstitutional. The issue  is 
whether the police were lawfully present, not 
simply the place where the seizure took place.  
(Un)lawful Entry?
The accused maintained that the  mother was not 
able in law to consent to the police entering  the 
family home to seize his computer. The issue though, 
as the Court of Appeal noted, was not whether the 
mother could consent to the police searching  the 
contents of the computer (where the accused had a 
very high expectation of privacy in the information it 
contained), but whether she could consent to the 
police entry into the family residence where the 
computer was located. Justice Cameron found the 
police entry authorized. The mother was the 
accused’s wife and lived in the home. She had the 
authority to provide consent to enter the area where 
the computer was located (a shared area of the 
home)  and, as found by the trial judge, provided 
informed consent. 
Reasonable Grounds?
For an officer to have reasonable grounds, “there 
must be a subjectively  held belief by the police as 
well as a  readily ascertainable objective belief.”  In 
this case, neither officer testified as to their 
subjective belief nor that they were relying  on s. 489
(2)  to justify the seizure. But the Court of Appeal 
found this did not matter. First, a trial judge can infer 
subjective belief as to the existence of reasonable 
grounds where the police officer does not 
specifically  testify to such a belief as long  as such an 
inference was supported by the evidence. Here, 
there  was sufficient evidence on which the trial 
judge could infer that the officers subjectively 
believed there were reasonable grounds that the 
computer was used in the commission of an offence 
and/or that it would afford evidence of an 
offence.  Second, s. 489(2)  can apply even when a 
police officer testifies that a seizure was founded on 
a different basis (such as consent). ”Jurisprudence 
has demonstrated that a seizure made under 
mistaken authority is not necessarily fatal where 
authority otherwise exists,” said Justice Cameron. 
“The officers met the requisite conditions to seize 
the computer pursuant to s. 489(2) of the Code.  The 
fact that they did not state that they were relying  on 
that section is not fatal. Also not fatal is the fact that 
they were relying  on different authority, that being 
the consent of the mother, to seize.” The seizure of 
the computer was lawful under s. 489(2) and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DOCUMENTS	 IN	 POSSESSION	 
USED	 AS	 CIRCUMSTANTIAL	 
EVIDENCE:	 NOT	 INADMISSIBLE	 
HEARSAY
R. v. Black, 2014 BCCA 192
The police executed a warrant to 
search for electricity theft and 
discovered a marihuana grow 
operation in an outbuilding  on a 
rural property. The outbuilding  was 
dedicated solely to the grow operation and the 
accused was seen to manipulate the lock as she 
exited it on the morning  the warrant was executed. 
An unsigned and undated one-page  handwritten 
note  was found in a grow room in the outbuilding 
addressed to someone named “Chrissy,” containing 
what appeared to be a “to-do” list of tasks related to 
the grow operation. The note directed "Chrissy" to 
move upstairs plants and set something, as well as 
report that “Gary never did finish the  fan, I will do 
this morn.” The accused was charged with drug 
offences. 
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British Columbia Provincial Court 
The judge concluded that “Chrissy” was 
the accused and inferred from the list of 
tasks that she was involved in the 
production of marihuana at the grow 
operation. Based on the circumstantial evidence she 
was convicted of producing  marihuana and 
possessing it for the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused claimed, among 
other things, that the note was 
inadmissible hearsay and the trial 
judge erred in relying  on its 
contents as evidence that she was involved in the 
grow operation. The Crown, on the other hand, 
suggested the note was not being  tendered for the 
truth of its contents. Instead, it was a document 
found in the accused’s possession and was 
admissible as circumstantial evidence of her 
association with the outbuilding  and her 
involvement with the grow operation. 
  
Documents in Possession Rule
The long-standing  and well-established “documents 
in possession rule provides that the contents of a 
document found in possession of the accused may 
be used as circumstantial evidence of the accused’s 
involvement in the transactions to which the 
documents relate.” The Court of Appeal found the 
content of the note relating  to the grow operation 
was circumstantial evidence of the accused’s 
involvement in the transactions to which they 
related. The accused was found by the trial judge to 
be “Chrissy”. Justine Levin went on to state:
The inference of the [accused’s] involvement in 
the grow operation does not derive from whether 
it is true that the upstairs short plants should be 
moved downstairs or that she “knew how to set” 
something and should “just keep on hitting  the 
set button”. It is derived from the location of the 
Note in the outbuilding, containing  a list of tasks 
to do in relation to the grow operation which 
occupied the whole of the outbuilding, to which 
the [accused] was one of a few people who had 
access and to whom the Note was addressed. 
[para. 39]
The note was admissible under the documents in 
possession rule as circumstantial evidence and was 
not relied upon by the trial judge as the truth of its 
contents (inadmissible hearsay inferences). The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ALL	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 TO	 BE	 
CONSIDERED	 IN	 REASONABLE	 
GROUNDS	 DETERMINATION
R. v. Brown, 2014 ONCA 525
Police received information from a 
reliable  confidential source that a 
known drug  trafficker would be 
receiving  a quantity of drugs from his 
supplier, whose street name was 
“Dee”. This transaction was expected to take place 
after midnight on a specified date. The police had 
previously videotaped Dee when he was sitting  on a 
bench with the known drug  trafficker. At 1:18 am 
police saw a silver Nissan Sentra  drive past and park 
a block away from the drug  trafficker’s residence. An 
officer drove towards the vehicle at 30-35 km/h with 
his high beams on in an attempt to identify  the 
occupants. He believed that Dee was seated in the 
driver’s seat of the Nissan and the drug  trafficker was 
beside him in the passenger seat. Police approached 
the vehicle with guns drawn and arrested the 
accused. He was found in possession of 28.9 grams 
of powder cocaine and 13 grams of crack cocaine.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The officer said his identification of the 
accused was based mostly on the fact that 
he was a black male with his hair in a 
ponytail on the top  of his head - the same 
way Dee's hair was styled in the video recorded 
earlier. He also relied on "the face in general”, 
saying  his initial focus was on the driver and he was 
only able to glance quickly  at the passenger. 
Although the person on the passenger side of the 
vehicle resembled the known drug  trafficker, it 
turned out not to be him.
The accused adduced evidence from two witnesses 
(an articling  student and a  forensic engineer 
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specializing  in accident reconstruction) who 
conducted drive-by simulations replicating  the 
circumstances of the night in question. Both testified 
that when they drove past the Nissan Sentra with 
their high beams on they could not identify any of 
the occupants’ facial features. In the accused’s view, 
if the officer was unable to make out the accused’s 
facial features, he could not have identified him and 
could not have had reasonable grounds to support 
his belief that the accused was in the vehicle, selling 
or intending  to sell drugs. Since the arresting  officer 
could not have had reasonable grounds for the 
arrest, the accused opined that the drug  evidence 
should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
The judge concluded that the constellation of 
circumstances relied upon by the arresting  officer 
objectively amounted to reasonable and probable 
grounds, even considering  the testimony of the 
defence witnesses. In addition, the  judge found that 
even if the arrest was unlawful, the admission of the 
evidence would not bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The accused was convicted of 
possession for the  purpose of trafficking  and 
sentenced to 13 months in jail. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accu sed appea l ed h i s 
conviction arguing  that the trial 
judge erred in finding  there were 
objectively reasonable grounds for 
his arrest. He also claimed that the evidence 
obtained from the search of his person and vehicle 
ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2). The 
Court of Appeal, however, rejected the accused’s 
submissions, stating:
First, in determining whether the grounds for 
arrest were objectively reasonable, the trial 
judge was entitled to consider, as he did, all the 
surrounding  circumstances. Those circumstances 
included:
i. the information received from a reliable 
informant that a drug dealer would be 
receiving  drugs from his supplier (the 
[accused], who was known to the arresting 
officer) in the early morning hours of the 
day in question;
ii. the observation of a vehicle parked on a 
street near the dealer’s home at 1:18  a.m. 
on the day in question;
iii. the officer’s observations of the [accused] in 
the company of the drug dealer on two 
previous occasions, the last of which was 
two and one-half months earlier, and his 
review prior to the arrest of a video taken of 
the [accused] on that occasion; and
iv. the [accused’s] distinctive hairstyle, which 
consisted of a ponytail flipped up at the 
back and worn at the top of his head.
These circumstances provided important context 
to the officer’s identification of the [accused] as 
he drove past the parked car with the highbeams 
of his truck on. [reference omitted, para. 4]
As for reconciling  the officer’s evidence with the 
testimony of the defence witnesses that it was 
impossible to make out the facial features of the 
occupants of the vehicle as they drove past in their 
simulations, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial 
judge’s understanding of the evidence:
A careful reading of the officer’s evidence 
indicates that the most important factor in his 
identification of the [accused] was his 
distinctively placed ponytail, a feature with 
which the officer was familiar, based on his 
earlier observations. The [accused’s] hair had 
been cut and the ponytail removed when the 
defence witnesses performed their simulations. 
As well, the officer did not say he observed any 
specific features, but said he recognized the face 
“in general”.
In our view, the trial judge’s acceptance of the 
officer’s evidence was not inconsistent with his 
acceptance of the evidence of the defence 
witnesses who said they were unable to observe 
facial features. [paras. 5-6]
“[I]n determining whether the grounds for arrest were objectively reasonable, the trial judge 
was entitled to consider... all the surrounding circumstances.”
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Since both the subjective and objective requirements 
of reasonable grounds were satisfied, the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional case  facts taken from R. v. 
Brown, [2012] O.J. No. 3605 (OntCA)
SPECULATION	 ABOUT	 OFFICER’S	 
MOTIVES	 IMPROPER
R. v. Brodeur, 2014 NBCA 44
A member of a roving  traffic unit with 
a police service dog  was patrolling 
the Trans-Canada Highway. While 
sitting  in an unmarked vehicle in a 
110 km/h posted zone, he captured 
three  radar readings: 120 km/h, 125 km/h and 130 
km/h. He believed a black vehicle driven by the 
accused and passing  other vehicles was travelling  at 
the 130 km/h speed. The officer pursued the accused 
vehicle for about 1.5 km before turning  on his 
flashing  police lights and pulling  him over. The 
officer approached the passenger side, smelled 
perfume and saw an open bottle of Axe perfume in 
plain view in the  vehicle’s console. As the smell of 
perfume dissipated the officer could then smell raw 
marihuana and arrested the accused. He searched 
the vehicle incident to arrest and discovered 14 
pounds of marihuana in ziplock bags, which were 
not vacuumed sealed. The police service dog  was 
never deployed during  the stop. The accused was 
charged with possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking.
New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer, a 23  year police veteran with 
previous experience in a drug  section, 
testified that, based upon his experience 
and training, perfume is used to 
camouflage marihuana odour and the perfume smell 
was an indication to him that the vehicle might be 
carrying  contraband drugs. He had taken “Pipeline” 
training, which teaches police officers about signs 
and indicators of other offences that might be taking 
place while performing  a routine traffic stop. The 
accused said he was not speeding  and believed the 
officer stopped the wrong  vehicle. The judge 
accepted much of the accused’s evidence and 
rejected the officer’s. Although he found the officer 
stopped the right vehicle travelling  at 130 km/h, the 
judge found the officer was deliberately misleading 
the court.  As well, the judge used the officer’s 
training, experience and resources as a basis for 
determining  his motives and truthfulness. The judge 
found the officer’s mission was to stop and catch 
drug  traffickers. The judge found the accused was 
arbitrarily  detained under s. 9 of the Charter, 
excluded the evidence under s. 24(2)  and entered a 
not guilty verdict.
 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed by arguing 
that the trial judge erroneously 
grounded some of his critical 
factual conclusions on speculation 
and conjecture, including  findings on the officer’s 
motives and truthfulness based on his training, 
equipment, resources and duties. Justice Bell, 
delivering  the Court of Appeal’s decision, agreed. 
Even though the  officer was assigned to a traffic unit 
patrolling  the  only major arterial highway and was 
trained in the use of his radar unit, his Pipeline 
training  and the presence of a police dog  caused the 
trial judge to speculate  about the officer’s purpose 
for the stop: 
 
In my view, speculating about [the officer’s] 
motives for stopping [the accused’s] vehicle 
based upon equipment, resources available and 
direction of traffic is tantamount to questioning 
the motives or credibility of a police officer 
accused of excessive force because he happens 
to carry a baton or a revolver and is trained in its 
use.  The approach adopted by the trial judge 
appears to advance the notion that Charter 
violations will be easier to prove when the 
arresting  officer testifying is highly trained and 
has significant resources available to him or her, 
the presumption being that the police officer 
would use that knowledge and equipment for an 
improper purpose. The converse, of course, is 
that where police officers are poorly trained and 
have limited resources available, the court will 
be less inclined to be skeptical of their motives 
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and less inclined to find a Charter breach. I need 
make no comment on the legitimacy of such an 
approach.
 
A proper inference contains two essential elements: 
(1)  it must be rational and (2)  it must be based on the 
evidence. Here, the trial judge’s conclusion about 
the officer’s motives and truthfulness, among other 
findings, was neither rational nor based on the 
evidence. As a result of these legal errors, the 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal 
was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE	 SUSPICION:	 EACH	 
CIRCUMSTANCE	 NOT	 TO	 BE	 
CONSIDERED	 SEPARATELY
R. v. Yates, 2014 SKCA 52
 
At about 1:20 am an officer heard a 
motor vehicle create a  very loud 
noise while passing  by  the police 
station. He searched for and found 
the suspect vehicle, then followed it. 
The vehicle intermittently travelled at speeds of 70 to 
80 km/h in a 50 km/h zone and also made a very 
abrupt move from the left lane in which it was 
traveling  into the right lane and then abruptly move 
back into the left lane for no apparent reason. The 
officer pulled the vehicle over to investigate the 
traffic concerns. When the officer attended at the 
driver side window, he told the accused why he had 
been stopped and asked him to produce his driver’s 
licence. At this time, the officer detected the odour 
of alcohol from the  vehicle through its open 
window. He saw that the accused’s eyes were 
“somewhat bloodshot” and glossy. Based on these 
observations, the officer suspected the accused had 
alcohol in his body and, at 1:27 am, asked him to 
step out of his vehicle and gave an ASD demand. 
The accused complied and a  “fail” reading 
registered. The accused was arrested for impaired 
driving, advised of his right to counsel, a breath 
demand was made, and he was transported to the 
police station. After he spoke  to a lawyer two breath 
samples in excess of 80 mg% were obtained and the 
accused was charged accordingly.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
 
The judge accepted the off icer’s 
observations as evidence but concluded 
that the reasonable  suspicion standard for 
demanding  an ASD sample had not been 
met. In her view, the officer did not consider the 
source of the alcohol odour prior to making  the ASD 
demand. Therefore, the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused had 
alcohol or a drug  in his body at the time of the 
demand. Thus the requirements of s. 254(2)  Criminal 
Code  had not been met. The judge found violations 
of  ss. 8  and s. 9 of the Charter and the results of the 
ASD test and Intoxilyzer readings were excluded. 
The accused was acquitted.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
 
A Crown appeal was unsuccessful. The 
appeal judge found the Crown bore the 
burden of adducing  evidence to support 
the objective  reasonableness of the 
officer’s suspicion. Here, there were insufficient facts 
to infer that the accused was the source of the odour 
as opposed to his vehicle. “Only if the accused was 
alone in the vehicle could such an inference be 
drawn,” said the appeal judge. Since the Crown 
failed to lead evidence  on the number of persons in 
the vehicle, the smell of alcohol could not form part 
of the objective  component of the police officer’s 
reasonable suspicion to make the demand. As a 
result, the findings of ss. 8 and 9 Charter breaches 
were sustained and the accused’s acquittal upheld.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed again 
arguing, in part, that the police 
officer did not breach the 
accused’s ss. 8 and 9 rights. In 
the Crown’s opinion, the  appeal court judge 
misinterpreted the standard of “reasonable grounds 
to suspect” and misapplied the standard to the 
relevant facts. 
Justice Klebuc first reviewed the evidentiary burdens 
in this case. An accused carries the burden of 
proving  a  breach of their Charter rights. A 
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warrantless search or seizure is presumed to be 
unreasonable. Thus, an accused can establish a s. 8 
Charter violation by demonstrating  that a warrantless 
search or seizure took place. Then, the onus shifts to 
the Crown to show that the search or seizure  was 
reasonable. An ASD demand under s. 254(2)(b)  is a 
warrantless search and will only be reasonable if it is 
authorized by law, if the law itself is reasonable, and 
if the manner in which the search was carried out is 
reasonable. 
Reasonable Grounds to Suspect
The Crown suggested that the lower court applied 
the higher evidentiary burden of “reasonable 
grounds to believe” to an ASD demand, rather than 
the lower standard of “reasonable grounds to 
suspect” that the driver had alcohol in his or her 
body. The accused, on the other hand, contended 
that the smell of alcohol flowing  out of the window 
of his vehicle, his “somewhat bloodshot” and glossy 
eyes, his violation of the speed limit, and his erratic 
driving  did not, collectively, amount to a 
“reasonable suspicion” that he had alcohol in his 
body.
 
Justice Klebuc found the authority of a police officer 
to demand a driver provide a breath sample for 
analysis into an ASD under s. 254(2)(b) on the basis 
of “reasonable  grounds to suspect” was less onerous 
than the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe” 
required under s. 254(3)  to demand a breath sample 
for the purpose of determining  whether the driver’s 
ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by 
alcohol. He found a valid demand under s. 254(2)(b) 
required:
 
• “the police  officer must subjectively (or 
honestly) suspect the detained driver has 
alcohol in his or her body; and
• the police officer’s subjective suspicion must 
be based on a constellation of objectively 
verifiable circumstances, which collectively 
indicate that the suspicion that the detained 
driver has alcohol in his or her body is 
reasonable.”
 
 He continued:
Consequently, the constellation of circumstances 
need not be sufficient to prove the detained 
person actually has alcohol in his or her body. 
Nor should each circumstance in the 
constellation be separated, analysed and 
evaluated apart from the constellation. Rather, 
the adequacy of a police officer’s suspicion is to 
be assessed under the de novo analysis called 
for in R. v. MacKenzie using  this test: would a 
reasonable person, standing  in the shoes of the 
investigating  police officer and aware of all of 
the objectively verifiable evidence, reasonably 
suspect the driver had alcohol in his or her 
BY THE BOOK:
Breath	 Demands: Criminal Code
254(2)   If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol 
or a drug in their body … the peace officer 
may, by demand, require the person to ... (b) 
to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in 
the peace officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to 
be made by means of an approved screening device and, if 
necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.
  
254(3)   If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person is committing, or at any time within 
the preceding three hours has committed, an offense under 
section 253 as a result of the consumption of alcohol, the 
peace officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, 
require the person (a) to provide, as soon as practicable, (i) 
samples of breath that, in a qualified technician’s opinion, 
will enable a proper analysis to be made to determine the 
concentration, if any, of alcohol in the person’s blood ... .
[emphasis added]
... ... ...
“It is an error in law to dissect the constellation of circumstances and individually test each 
circumstance or the absence of other circumstances.”
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body? The reviewing court is not to consider 
whether the investigating officer’s suspicion was 
accurate or whether other inferences could be 
drawn from the constellation of circumstances, 
or to consider whether the investigating  officer 
could have taken further steps to confirm or 
dispel a prima facie reasonably held suspicion 
that alcohol was present in the driver’s body. It is 
an error in law to dissect the constellation of 
circumstances and individually test each 
circumstance or the absence of other 
circumstances. [para. 34]
 
Justice Klebuc concluded that the lower courts 
erroneously required the Crown to prove the higher 
standard of reasonable belief as opposed to the 
lower standard of reasonable suspicion. It was not 
necessary for the Crown to establish that the 
accused probably had alcohol in his body. The 
proper standard of reasonable suspicion only 
required that the  Crown prove a reasonable 
suspicion that a driver possibly had alcohol in his or 
her body. Thus, the  Crown did not have to eliminate 
other possible sources for the alcohol odour coming 
from the accused’s vehicle. Furthermore, the full 
constellation of circumstances leading  the officer to 
form his suspicion that the accused had alcohol in 
his body must be considered:  
 
In my respectful view, the requirement that an 
investigating  officer must have direct proof of a 
driver having  alcohol in his or her body in order 
to found a reasonable suspicion that the driver 
has alcohol in his or her body is inconsistent 
with the prescr ibed s tandard and the 
requirements of s. 254(2)(b). ...[T]he applicable 
evidentiary standard only requires the 
investigating  officer to have a reasonable 
suspicion that a driver has alcohol in his or her 
body, based on a constellation of objective 
events. The constellation of necessity may 
include factors capable of an innocent or 
innocuous explanation. ... “[F]actors that give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion may also support 
completely innocent explanations. This is 
acceptable, as the reasonable suspicion standard 
addresses the possibility of uncovering 
criminality, and not a probability of doing 
so.” [reference omitted, para. 38]  
And further:
There is no onus on the Crown to adduce 
evidence to support or disprove the alternative 
scenarios of the defence as to the possible 
source of the odour of beverage alcohol. The 
Crown need only prove that the inferences 
drawn by the investigating  officer are rational 
and reliable on the basis of the evidence it has 
adduced and that, on the whole of it, the facts 
known to the investigating officer and inferences 
of fact drawn by the investigating officer 
reasonably support a suspicion that the accused 
had alcohol in his or her body.
 
By holding the Crown to dispel speculation that 
other persons were in the vehicle or to 
definitively show that the [accused] was the 
source (or was the probable source) of the odour 
of beverage alcohol, the trial court and the 
appeal court mistakenly elevated the evidentiary 
and persuasive burden imposed on the Crown 
and held the Crown to establish the validity of 
the s. 254(2)(b) demand on a standard greater 
than “reasonable suspicion.” [paras. 45-46]
Applying  the law to the facts in this case, the Court 
of Appeal found that “a reasonable person standing 
in the shoes of the officer and aware of the entire 
aforementioned objective factors, would reasonably 
suspect that the [accused] had alcohol in his body.” 
The accused was the  driver, he  drove at speeds 
significantly greater than the posted speed limit, 
drove in an erratic  manner, made excessive noise 
while passing  the police station at approximately 
1:00 am, an odour of alcohol beverage emanated 
from the driver’s door window, his eyes were 
“somewhat bloodshot” and glossy, and he stopped 
his vehicle in a safe manner. “The possibility of 
another person or source for the odour did not 
undermine the rational inference that the odour 
might have been coming  from the accused. “Given 
the officer had smelled the odour of beverage 
alcohol flowing  out of the vehicle’s open window, 
the officer could rationally infer that the [accused] 
was the source of the odour,” said Justice Klebuc. 
“Moreover, nothing  in the evidence before  the trial 
court eliminated the [accused] as a possible source 
of the odour.”
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The s. 254(2)(b)  demand and resulting  ASD test did 
not amount to an unreasonable search or seizure  nor 
was there an arbitrary detention. The accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
A Different View
Justice Jackson, in dissent, concluded 
there  were no errors made by the trial 
judge in finding  ss. 8 and 9 breaches. 
“Having  regard for the officer’s agreement 
that the smell of alcohol was not coming  from the 
breath or body of the accused, the totality of the 
circumstances could only amount to a ‘mere 
suspicion’ that [the accused] had alcohol in his body 
at the time the demand was made,” she said. Since a 
new trial had been ordered by the majority, she 
found it unnecessary to address the trial judge’s 
decision to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
911	 ENTRY:	 CURSORY	 SEARCH	 
JUSTIFIED	 IN	 CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Depace, 2014 ONCA 519
A grandmother called 911 after 
receiving  a call from her 11 year old 
grandson that his parents were 
fighting. The police attended and, 
after they knocked and identified 
themselves, saw the kitchen light turned off and 
heard a dog  barking. But 
no one answered the 
door. The police checked 
their records on the 
home’s occupant. They 
had the accused’s name 
and photograph as well as 
information that he was 
associated with the Hell’s 
Angels. After 25 minutes 
the police forcibly  entered the home. They saw the 
accused, who appeared to be drunk, as well as a 
woman and boy on the main floor of the house, 
which was relatively small and open. An officer 
decided to check both upstairs and downstairs for 
officer safety and to make sure there was no one else 
present who may have needed help. In the basement 
police saw evidence of drug  dealing, including 
cocaine, scales, cash and debt lists. The police then 
obtained a search warrant and found a large quantity 
of cocaine and cash. The accused was charged with 
drug offences.
Ontario Superior Court
The officer testified that he did not know 
exactly who was who regarding  the 911 
call or whether there wasn’t another 
person there who had been involved in 
the reported fighting. The judge rejected the 
accused’s challenge to the warrantless search.  He 
found no s. 8  Charter breach and, even if there was 
a violation, would have nonetheless admitted the 
cocaine and money under s. 24(2). Convictions 
followed.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again challenged the 
warrantless search of his home. 
Although he agreed that the police 
could forcibly enter his home in 
response to the 911 call, he argued they were  not 
entitled to go to the basement where  they saw the 
drug  evidence in plain view. In his view, the exigent 
circumstances permitting  entry ended once  the 
police found the mother and child safe and 
unharmed, and all three occupants of the home 
were accounted for. He 
further submitted that the 
police could have assured 
themselves there was no 
one else  present by asking 
the occupants. The police 
had heard no noise or 
anything  else  to suggest 
t ha t t he re m igh t be 
someone else present.
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
submissions. “The fact that the occupants denied 
entry  to the police for 25 minutes made the 911 
situation much more acute and suspicious,” said the 
Court. It continued:
“[I]n the context of a 911 emergency call, the 
police do not need to take the word of the 
occupant that everything is alright. They are 
entitled to satisfy themselves. The extent of 
what they may need to do will depend on the 
particular circumstances.”
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As the Supreme Court said in R. v. Godoy ..., in 
the context of a 911 emergency call, the police 
do not need to take the word of the occupant 
that everything  is alright. They are entitled to 
satisfy themselves. The extent of what they may 
need to do will depend on the particular 
circumstances. In this case, the grandmother did 
not know who might be in the house as she was 
called by her grandson. [In] Godoy, the court 
stated the applicable principle as follows: 
“While there is no question that one’s privacy at 
home is a value to be preserved and promoted, 
privacy cannot trump the safety of all members 
of the house-hold.”
In this case, the search was undertaken for two 
legitimate purposes: to ensure no one else was 
there either injured or frightened on the one 
hand, or threatening  on the other. The search 
itself was cursory and non-invasive. [paras. 8-9]
Since there was no s. 8 breach, s. 24(2) was not 
triggered and the evidence was admissible.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OFFICER	 SAFETY	 RENDERED	 
DETENTION	 &	 SEARCH	 LAWFUL
R. v. B.S., 2014 BCCA 257
 
At about 2:30 am two police officers 
were on patrol in a marked police  car 
when they came across a group  of 
five young  people (appearing  under 
the age of 19)  walking  down the road 
in a residential area. One of the officers believed 
they may have been intoxicated based on their 
“buoyancy” and “body language”, which exhibited 
some swaying  as they walked. He decided to stop 
and check to see if they were okay and to ensure 
there  was no threat of property damage, which, in 
his experience, commonly occurred when young 
people were  intoxicated. The officer pulled his car 
ahead of the group, got out and started talking  to 
them. The officer could smell liquor coming  from 
someone in the group. One of the youths tried to 
walk away but was called back. He was exhibiting 
symptoms of intoxication but denied drinking. As the 
officer began to speak individually to the  youths, 
asking  for identification and about outstanding 
warrants, the accused (who had not yet been 
approached or spoken to directly) became fidgety. A 
second officer sitting  in the police car radioed that 
she could see the accused doing  something  behind 
his back.
 
The officer speaking  to the youths had safety 
concerns because he was dealing  with a group of 
five young  people. He told the accused he was 
going  to search him. The accused was handcuffed 
and searched, in a cursory fashion, for weapons. The 
officer found a baton in the small of the accused’s 
back and a bag  of cocaine. He was arrested for 
possessing  a weapon dangerous to the public peace 
and possessing  a controlled substance. Back at the 
police detachment further drugs were found in his 
possession.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
The accused testified that he believed he 
was not free to leave once the officer 
stopped the group. Although he was not 
told directly  that he could not leave, he 
assumed he could not leave when the other youth 
was called back. Another youth, however, testified 
that she believed the group was free  to leave. The 
officer said he stopped the group  under the Liquor 
Control and Licensing Act and as a preventive 
measure to talk to them and make sure they were 
not so intoxicated that they were a danger to 
themselves or to others’ property. He said he had no 
intention of detaining  the young  people, believed 
they were free to refuse to speak to him or to 
produce their identification and were free to walk 
away.
 
The accused argued his rights under ss. 8  and 9 of 
the Charter had been breached. He submitted that 
he had been arbitrarily detained when the officer 
first approached the group. The subsequent search 
and seizure of the drugs and baton were therefore 
unlawful. Further, he contended that his rights under 
s. 10(b) of the Charter and s. 25(2)  of the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act (YCJA)  were violated because he 
was not advised of his right to counsel immediately 
upon his detention. In his view, the evidence should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
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Although describing  this case as a  close call, the 
judge concluded that the accused was not detained 
when first stopped but was detained when the officer 
began to question him. By that time though, the 
officer had legitimate  concerns for officer safety 
which justified the search. Thus, the accused had not 
been arbitrarily detained nor subject to an 
unreasonable search. The safety concern also 
entitled the officer to search the accused before 
advising  him of his rights under s. 10. Since there 
were no Charter breaches, the evidence was 
admitted. Even if there  was a breach, the judge 
would have admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The accused was convicted of three counts of 
possessing  a controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking  (cocaine, ecstasy, and LSD) and carrying  a 
concealed weapon.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing  that the trial 
judge erred in finding  no Charter 
breaches nor a violation of the 
YCJA. In his view, he  was arbitrarily detained as 
soon as the officer approached and stopped the 
group, even before he was spoken to. He claimed he 
reasonably believed that the direction for the other 
youth to come back applied to him as well. The 
Crown, on the  other hand, argued that the trial judge 
did not err in finding  the accused was not detained 
until his furtive  gestures attracted attention and 
raised concerns for officer safety, leading  to the 
search and the discovery of the baton and drugs.
 
Detention
 
Just because a person is delayed or kept waiting  by 
police does not necessarily mean they are 
psychologically detained. “Whether there has been 
a detention is determined by an objective test: 
having  regard to the  entire  interaction, would the 
actions of the police  cause a reasonable person in 
the position of the  suspect to conclude that he or she 
is not free to go, and must comply with the 
directions of the police,” said Justice Neilson for the 
Court of Appeal. The factors considered in deciding 
whether an interaction with police amounts to a 
psychological detention include the circumstances 
of the encounter, the nature of the police conduct 
and the particular characteristics or circumstances of 
the individual.
 
The Court of Appeal agreed this was a close call but 
found the trial judge did not err in finding  the 
accused was not detained until questioned by 
police:
 
• Circumstances of the encounter.  The 
appearance and behaviour of the group 
justified reasonable police inquiries. The officer 
believed the  group  wandering  down the street 
at 2:30 am was under the legal drinking  age 
and, based on his experience, exhibited a 
degree of exuberance and some mobility 
characteristics that he associated with 
intoxication and potential property damage. 
This impression was confirmed when he 
smelled alcohol on approaching  the  group, and 
observed signs of impairment in one of the 
youth. 
“Whether there has been a detention is determined by an objective test: having regard to 
the entire interaction, would the actions of the police cause a reasonable person in the 
position of the suspect to conclude that he or she is not free to go, and must comply with 
the directions of the police.”
BY THE BOOK:
Right	 to	 Counsel: Youth Criminal Justice Act
Arresting officer to advise young person of 
right to counsel
s. 25(2) Every young person who is arrested or 
detained shall, on being arrested or detained, 
be advised without delay by the arresting 
officer or the officer in charge, as the case may be, of the 
right to retain and instruct counsel, and be given an 
opportunity to obtain counsel. 
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• Nature of the police conduct.  The officer had 
no intention of detaining  the group, believed 
they were free to refuse to speak to him or 
produce their identification and were free to 
walk away. His tone was conversational, and he 
had no physical contact with any of the young 
people before his dealings with the accused. 
He said he expected that once he finished 
talking  with each of them, he would be on his 
way. Asking  the young  people for identification 
and about outstanding  warrants provided some 
support for a conclusion the officer’s inquiries 
were directed at investigation rather than 
prevention but there was no evidence of the 
responses he received. Nor was there  evidence 
that the police followed up with computer 
checks, or other action to further these 
inquiries. Instead, all but the accused were 
permitted to leave.
Although the officer called back one of the 
group members as he walked away, another 
youth testified she believed they were free  to 
leave. After greeting  the  young  people generally, 
the officer dealt with each of them individually 
and sequentially. He had not yet approached 
the accused or communicated with him directly 
before he attracted police attention through his 
own actions - becoming  “fidgety” with his 
hands behind his back. It was open to the trial 
judge to find that the accused was not the 
subject of “focussed suspicion” amounting  to a 
detention but rather someone who was 
“delayed” or “kept waiting” while the officer 
dealt with the others in the group.
• Characteristics of the accused.  The accused’s 
age and relative sophistication did not 
undermine the trial judge’s finding.
 
The trial judge made no error in finding  that the 
accused was not detained until the officer 
approached him directly and told him he was going 
to search him. “At that point there were legitimate 
concerns for officer safety,” said Justice Neilson. 
“The youths were unfamiliar to [the officer], he did 
not know what the [accused] was doing  behind his 
back, and he was concerned the [accused] might 
have a weapon. The justifiable  concern for officer 
safety rendered the [accused’s] detention and search 
lawful, and precluded a finding  that his rights under 
s. 8 and s. 9 of the Charter had been violated.”
 
Right to Counsel
As for the alleged s. 10 breach, the “safety concern 
also justified a postponement of the officers’ 
obligation to advise the [accused] of his rights under 
s. 10 of the Charter.” Similarly, s. 25(2) YCJA was not 
violated. 
The Court of Appeal also agreed with the trial judge 
that, had the accused’s rights been infringed, the 
admission of the evidence would not have brought 
the administration of justice into disrepute.
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
TOTALITY	 OF	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 
INFORMS	 REASONABLE	 
GROUNDS	 ANALYSIS
R. v. Slippery, 2014 SKCA 23                   
The accused had a few alcoholic 
drinks after work. When driving 
home he noticed his vehicle was 
swerving  so he pulled it over into a 
ditch on the side of the road. Police 
were called by other drivers and, shortly after 1:00 
am, they arrived. The accused appeared to be asleep 
inside the car. The officer had difficultly  arousing 
him and getting  documentation from him. He 
smelled strongly of liquor, had glossy eyes, slurred 
his speech, was slow in answering  questions, and 
stumbled backward, leaning  against his car. Breath 
samples were demanded and the accused was 
charged with care and control over the legal limit. 
 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the police officer had 
reasonable  grounds to believe the 
accused had care and control of a motor 
vehicle while over the legal limit. He 
stated the test for determining  whether reasonable 
and probable grounds existed was “whether, on the 
whole of the evidence adduced, a reasonable 
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person, standing  in the shoes of the officer, would 
have believed that the individual’s ability to operate 
a ... motor vehicle was impaired.” The certificate of 
analysis was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of over 80 mg%.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing, among  other 
things, that the trial judge erred by 
considering  irrelevant facts in 
assessing  whether reasonable grounds existed and in 
concluding  that such grounds were objectively 
justified. He submitted that the trial judge referred to 
facts that were not known to the officer when he 
made the breath demand, such his own testimony 
that he parked his car because he had been drinking 
earlier and might have been impaired when he was 
driving, and his falling  to sleep between the two 
breath samples. Justice Whitmore, delivering  the 
unanimous judgment, found the judge applied the 
correct legal test:
In assessing whether there are reasonable and 
probable grounds, the Court must look at the 
facts known to the officer which were available 
to the officer at the time he or she formed the 
requisite belief. The events which came to light 
subsequently to the formation of the officer’s 
belief are not relevant in determining whether 
the police officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds for his belief at the time he formed the 
belief. Although the totality of the evidence must 
be considered, this does not include post-
demand conduct. The totality of the evidence is 
that which is available to the police officer at the 
time he held the belief.
The emphasis on considering the totality of the 
circumstances exists to avoid concentrating  on 
individual pieces of evidence which are offered 
to establish the existence of reasonable and 
probable grounds. One indicium of impairment 
may not amount to reasonable and probable 
grounds on its own.  One must consider all of 
the circumstances to assess whether the officer 
had reasonable and probable grounds to make 
the demand. [references omitted, paras. 21-22]
In Justice Whitmore’s view, the trial judge did not 
consider facts not know to the officer as factors in 
assessing  whether the officer had reasonable 
grounds to make the demand.
As for the objective  grounds, the Court of Appeal 
concluded the officer had “ample and compelling 
reasons to believe the [accused] was impaired.”  “In 
assessing  whether the officer’s belief was reasonable 
a court must measure the facts as the police officer 
honestly understood them to be,” said Justice 
Whitmore. “The lawfulness of an arrest must be 
judged on the circumstances that were apparent to 
the officer at the time, even if those circumstances 
turn out to be inaccurate.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
MARIHUANA	 ODOUR	 SUFFICIENT	 
TO	 JUSTIFY	 ARREST
R. v. MacCannell, 2014 BCCA 254
 
A police officer stopped the accused 
after observing  his truck speeding 
along  a  highway. The officer 
approached the driver’s side and 
spoke to the accused through an 
open window. He obtained a  driver’s licence and 
other documents and began to walk back to his 
police car. As he walked past the rear door, he 
smelled an overwhelming  odour of vegetative 
marihuana coming  from the accused’s truck. The 
officer immediately  returned to the driver’s door, 
“The emphasis on considering the totality of the circumstances exists to avoid 
concentrating on individual pieces of evidence which are offered to establish the existence 
of reasonable and probable grounds. One indicium of impairment may not amount to 
reasonable and probable grounds on its own. One must consider all of the circumstances to 
assess whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the demand.”
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told the accused he could smell an “overpowering 
smell of marihuana” coming  from inside the truck 
and arrested him. The vehicle was then searched and 
a cardboard box containing  50 starter marihuana 
plants was found behind the driver’s seat. The officer 
also found a Mason jar and baggie both containing 
marihuana on the passenger side and four pounds of 
dried marihuana in the truck’s canopy area. At the 
police station a  further 34  pounds of marihuana, 
cannabis resin and $4,000 in cash was located. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
Although the officer testified he could not 
estimate the quantity of 
mar ihuana f rom smel l 
alone, he said that the 
overwhelming  odour of vegetative 
marihuana was the  only basis for his 
conclusion that he had reasonable 
grounds for the arrest. The officer found 
the smell so overpowering  that he 
formed the opinion “there was 
marihuana actually  present in the 
pickup, not the remnants of smells from 
marihuana being  there at some time 
previously.” The judge noted the 
officer’s extensive experience involving 
marihuana investigations and ability  to distinguish 
between the distinctive smells of “burnt”, “growing 
or vegetative” and “dried” marihuana. 
The judge concluded that the smell of vegetative 
marihuana, without any other factors, was sufficient 
for the officer to form the necessary reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused for possession of 
marihuana under s. 495(1)(b)  of the  Criminal Code. 
The judge also held that the existence of other 
possible  explanations for the smell of marihuana did 
not mean that the officer could not have reasonable 
grounds to arrest based on the  odour alone. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his conviction 
suggesting  that his arrest was 
unlawful and the search of his 
vehicle incidental to that arrest was 
unreasonable. First, he suggested that under s. 495
(1)(a) a  peace officer may only arrest for an 
indictable offence. Since the officer could not 
determine the quantity of marihuana, he  could not 
have reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused possessed 
more than 30 grams of it 
( m a k i n g  i t i n d i c t a b l e ) ; 
possession of 30 grams or less 
is a summary only offence. 
Second, if the arrest was made 
under s. 495(1)(b), odour alone 
was insufficient to constitute 
reasonable grounds. Third, the 
officer failed to consider other 
possible explanations of the 
presence of marihuana such as 
a medical access authorization.
Arrest & Reasonable Grounds
Justice Garson, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
rejected the accused’s arguments. He found the 
arrest was lawful under s. 495(1)(b)  which “permits 
an officer to arrest an individual who is committing  a 
criminal offence either summary conviction or 
indictable.” 
“An officer may only arrest an individual for an 
offence under ss. [495(1)]  (b) where the officer 
personally witnesses facts or events that can support 
an objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is 
presently committing  an offence,” said Justice 
Garson. He continued:
[A]n arrest for possession of marihuana in the 
circumstances of ... this case is based on ss.  (b) 
not ss.  (a). As the Crown argues in this case, 
ss.  (b) provides for the arrest of an individual 
whom the arresting  officer “finds committing any 
offence”, whether summary or indictable. The 
Officer’s Experience
The officer testified he had come into contact with 
individuals possessing marihuana approximately 
1,000 times, had been involved in hundreds of 
vehicle stops involving the presence of marihuana 
and had been involved in 12−15 investigations of 
marihuana production or grow-op offences.
“An officer may only arrest 
an individual for an offence 
under [s. 495(1)(b)] where 
the officer personally 
witnesses facts or events 
that can support an 
objectively reasonable belief 
that the suspect is presently 
committing an offence.”
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significance of the arrest being  under ss.  (b) is 
that proof of the offence of possession does not 
depend on the amount of marihuana being 
greater than 30 grams. [The accused’s] argument 
that the officer could not have known or have 
had reasonable grounds to believe he was in 
possession of more than 30  grams is irrelevant. 
[para. 33]
The Court of Appeal found that the odour of 
marihuana alone, in this case, was sufficient to 
ground a credible belief that an offence was being 
committed. The officer had a subjective belief that 
the accused was in possession of marihuana. This 
belief was also objectively reasonable. “Standing  in 
the shoes of the officer, with his extensive 
experience, objectively  he could easily have  held a 
credibly  based belief that [the accused] was in 
possession of vegetative marihuana,” said Justice 
Garson. 
Alternate Explanations
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
submission that the  officer was required to consider 
and rule out other potential innocent explanations 
for possession of the marihuana such as an 
authorization to possess for medical needs or that 
the odour could have been left over from earlier use 
of the vehicle to transport marihuana:
[The reasonable grounds] standard does not 
require an officer to satisfy him or herself that 
there is evidence of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or even a prima facie case. All that the 
officer must have is an objectively reasonable 
basis for believing  the suspect is presently in 
possession of marihuana, without necessarily 
ruling out potentially innocent inferences, 
defences or lawful excuses. [para. 45]
The arrest was lawful and the search incidental to 
arrest did not breach s. 8  of the Charter. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
PENILE	 SWAB	 UNREASONABLE	 
AS	 AN	 INCIDENT	 TO	 ARREST
 R. v. Saeed, 2014 ABCA 238
The accused was arrested at 6:05 am 
for sexual assault after police 
received a complaint from a 15 year 
old girl. He was taken to the police 
station, but released sometime 
between 7:00 am and 7:30 am only to be re-arrested 
again at 8:35 am. He was placed in a “dry cell”, 
handcuffed to a steel pipe and seated on the floor 
with his hands behind his back. Police took 
photographs of him as well as a penile swab. He 
wiped his own penis with the swab  and then turned 
it over to the police. A subsequent DNA analysis of 
the swab showed DNA matching the complainant.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused wanted the DNA report 
resulting  from the penile swab excluded 
as evidence. The judge ruled that police 
conduct fell within definition of a strip 
search (R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83). She found the 
police took appropriate steps to ensure that the 
procedure was carried out in a reasonable fashion. 
Nevertheless, the judge concluded there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying  the search. None of 
the police officers testified about a  concern that the 
BY THE BOOK:
Warrantless	 Arrest: Criminal Code
s. 495 (1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; 
or
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, in any form 
set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto, is in force within 
the territorial jurisdiction in which the person is found.
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DNA evidence could be lost or degraded. The judge 
ruled the Crown had not established that obtaining 
the swab  was lawful as a search incident to arrest. 
The Crown therefore did not overcome the 
presumptive warrant requirement and the 
warrantless search breached the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights. But she found the evidence 
admissible  under s. 24(2) of anyway. The accused 
was convicted of sexual assault causing  bodily harm 
and sexual interference.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, in 
part, that the trial judge erred 
in admitting  the results of the 
penile swab as evidence. The 
Crown, on the other hand, argued that there was no 
s. 8  Charter violation in taking  the penile swab as a 
search and seizure incident to arrest.
A majority of the  Court of Appeal found the  penile 
swab in this case was not a proper exercise of the 
police power to search as an incident to the 
accused’s re-arrest:
Generally, it is our view that in the absence of a 
recognized exception to the presumptive 
requirement for prior judicial authorization to 
permit a search of this intimate sort to occur, the 
absence of that prior authorization means that 
there was a breach of the right of the [accused] 
to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. 
Those exceptions include situations where an 
accused consents to the search and seizure, 
where it is truly incidental to arrest in the sense 
it flows from a valid concern for officer safety or 
evidence preservation, or in situations of 
exigency. This last category deserves particular 
comment because its qualities and limitations 
dictate that it will rarely arise. [para. 50]
The majority found the character of the penile swab 
more intrusive than a strip  search and more akin to 
obtaining  bodily samples from a suspect (as in R. v. 
Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607). Justices Watson and 
Bielby stated:
We conclude, however, that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in R v Stillman... governs the 
disposition of this appeal; it cannot be 
distinguished on the basis that some of the 
seized material there was obtained from within 
the body, namely the dental impressions, 
whereas here the seized material was obtained 
from the surface of the body, from on the penis. 
The relevant question is not whether the seizure 
occurs from the surface of or from within any 
part of the body, but whether the nature of the 
area from which material is taken is such that the 
search and resulting seizure may infringe upon 
the person’s bodily dignity in such a way as to 
constitute the ultimate affront to human dignity. 
A typical person would judge an affront to their 
dignity of a greater nature through the taking  of a 
penile swab than a dental impression, 
notwithstanding the internal nature of the latter 
search and seizure.
In Canadian society, people generally identify 
themselves with their bodies. Non-consensual 
interferences with the body are experienced as a 
violation of human dignity. That is particularly so 
where the genital area is the subject of the 
search, although this principle is not limited to 
genital searches. [paras. 55-56]
And further:
In sum, unless a statute otherwise provides, a 
warrant is required for any intimate search and 
seizure for bodily samples from the person, 
absent consent, absent evidence which 
establishes that the time required to apply for a 
warrant could result in the bodily samples 
sought significantly deteriorating  or disappearing 
before a search and seizure under warrant could 
be undertaken or absent evidence of extreme 
exigency. Such a search cannot be justified, 
without warrant, simply on the basis of being 
incidental to arrest, without more. [para. 62]
Thus, the warrantless search and seizure (penile 
swab) was unreasonable under s. 8. However, the 
majority would not exclude the evidence under s. 
24(2), the accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions were upheld. 
“Non-consensual interferences with the body are experienced as a violation of human 
dignity. That is particularly so where the genital area is the subject of the search ...”
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A Second Opinion
Justice MacDonald disagreed with the 
majority. He concluded that there  was no 
s. 8  breach because, even in the absence 
of exigency, the search and seizure was 
proper as an incident to arrest. First, the arrest was 
lawful. Second, the search was related to the reasons 
for the arrest. The arrest was for sexual assault and 
the search was to determine whether the 
complainant’s DNA was on the accused. Finally, the 
search was executed reasonably. The police wanted 
to preserve  the evidence and did so in a respectful 
manner. The accused himself took the sample and 
handed it back to the officer. 
Furthermore, the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to justify  the  strip search as 
required by Golden. The search was conducted at 
the pol ice s ta t ion and there fore exigent 
circumstances were not required. Golden  only 
requires exigent circumstances if the strip search is 
conducted in the field. “In my opinion, there was no 
need for the police to have obtained a warrant in 
order to conduct the  penile swab as they had ample 
authority to do so pursuant to the common-law 
power of search incident to arrest, given the facts of 
this case i.e., a  sexual assault that had occurred 
mere hours before and the need to preserve 
important evidence,” said Justice MacDonald. 
Justice MacDonald also found the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Stillman  distinguishable. In that 
case, the  police  took samples of the accused‘s own 
bodily substances which would not deteriorate over 
time. In this case, the accused was being  swabbed 
for the DNA of another person (the  complainant) 
which would deteriorate over time: 
It would be an affront to one’s sense of justice 
for the police in this case to be required to stand 
idly by while highly relevant but time sensitive 
DNA evidence disappeared forever. Again it 
must be emphasized that this is potential DNA 
evidence of the complainant located on the 
[accused’s] body surface and not the [accused’s] 
own DNA. The latter situation is governed by R v 
Stillman. In my view, a telewarrant was not 
required as a precondition for the police to have 
conducted the penile swab in question. [para. 
36]
Justice MacDonald found the trial judge erred in 
finding  a s. 8  breach and the evidence was 
admissible. He too dismissed the accused’s appeal.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
INFORMANTS	 MAY	 CROSS-
CORROBORATE	 EACH	 OTHER
R. v. Evans, 2014 MBCA 44      
Based on information from five 
informants, four of which were first-
timers, the police obtained a search 
warrant under s. 487(1)(b)  of the 
Cr imina l Code . When pol ice 
executed the warrant at the accused’s premises their 
seizure included 19 STEN submachine guns, 
magazines and ammunition. As a result the accused 
was charged with possessing  stolen property, 
unlawful possession of various weapons and making 
a false firearms possession acquisition licence.   
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused brought a pre-trial motion 
alleging, in part, that the ITO lacked 
sufficient grounds to meet s. 487 
requirements. Although she found this to 
be a  “very close case”, the reviewing  judge 
dismissed the accused’s motion. After excising 
erroneous information, the judge found there was 
sufficient reliable information remaining  such that 
“[U]nless a statute otherwise provides, a warrant is required for any intimate search and 
seizure for bodily samples from the person, absent consent, absent evidence which 
establishes that the time required to apply for a warrant could result in the bodily samples 
sought significantly deteriorating or disappearing before a search and seizure under warrant 
could be undertaken or absent evidence of extreme exigency.”
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the issuing  justice could have granted the search 
warrant. She was satisfied that the information of 
two of the five informants in the  ITO was sufficiently 
detailed and corroborated to provide  the requisite 
reasonable grounds. Although first time informants, 
they both saw the accused in possession of a STEN 
submachine gun. The accused was ultimately 
convicted by a judge  and jury of manufacturing 
STEN submachine guns and four other firearm 
related offences. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions arguing, among  other 
grounds, that his s. 8 Charter  rights 
were breached by the search of his 
property. In his view, the reviewing  judge erred in 
concluding  that there was sufficient reliable 
information, after excision, to uphold the warrant. 
Justice Mainella, delivering  the  Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, disagreed. “In our view, when the 
information of informants Y and K is considered in 
the totality  of the circumstances, the  statutory pre-
conditions to issue  a search warrant for the 
[accused’s] property could have been satisfied,” he 
said.  He further added:
There was ample evidence in the ITO that the 
property of the [accused’s] son-in-law was being 
used for trafficking in STEN submachine guns.  
The inference that could be drawn from Y and 
K’s information is that the [accused’s] property 
(which was nearby to his son-in-law) was being 
used to store the guns and that the [accused] 
knew that, as he was seen by both informants 
with STEN submachine guns and K had seen 
such guns on the [accused’s] property.[para. 13]
Furthermore, the judge did not err in “considering 
the effect of informants, Y and K’s, information cross-
corroborating  each other in assessing  whether, in the 
totality  of the  circumstances, reasonable grounds to 
search the [accused’s] property existed.”  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canli.org
TERMS	 OF	 CONTRACT	 NEGATED	 
PRIVACY	 INTEREST	 IN	 PACKAGE
R. v. Godbout, 2014 BCCA 319
A young  man went to a DHL office 
(courier company)  in Alberta and 
dropped off a child’s toy  box for 
delivery to the accused in British 
Columbia. The man signed and was 
given a copy of the waybill. On the waybill there 
was a reference that the full terms of the shipping 
contract could be accessed on the DHL website. The 
shipping  contract included a term that DHL or any 
government authority could search the box without 
notice. It read:
The man paid the shipping  fee and left. The DHL 
worker recognized the man from a previous 
transaction. Due to his manner and presentation she 
was uncomfortable with the  transaction and decided 
to open the box. In the box she saw a child’s toy and 
two “bricks” wrapped in tape. Police were contacted 
the police and an officer attended the DHL office, 
met with staff and was directed to the open box. He 
took the box to the Calgary airport where he 
requested Canada Border Services agents to x-ray 
the box. He was advised there was an object inside 
likely made up of plant material consistent with 
marihuana. The officer then took  the package to his 
office and opened the bricks. Inside each brick were 
smaller baggies containing  cocaine totaling  535 
grams.
Alberta police sent the  box to a Vancouver police 
drug  section to arrange a controlled delivery of the 
package. The bricks were  repackaged with inert 
substances and a small amount of narcotics. Police 
obtained a tracking  warrant authorizing  the 
installation of a tracking  device in the DHL package 
and a general warrant authorizing  the entry into the 
residence of the location where the DHL package 
was located once the alarm had been activated. An 
officer, dressed as DHL staff, delivered the box to an 
“Without notice, DHL may, at its sole  discretion, 
open and inspect any shipment and its contents 
at any time. Customs authorities, or other 
governmental authorities, may also open and 
inspect  any shipment and its contents at any 
time.”
Volume 14 Issue 4 - July/August 2014
PAGE 28
apartment in British Columbia. The accused 
answered, confirmed his identity and signed for the 
package which was left with him. About 75 minutes 
later, the package alarm went off, police entered the 
apartment and the accused was arrested. A search 
warrant for the apartment was then obtained. In the 
apartment, police recovered the DHL package as 
well as over 600 ecstasy pills in a  safe, a digital 
scale  with white powder residue, score sheets, a stun 
gun, and plastic bags, one of which contained traces 
of cocaine and MDMA. They also retrieved text 
messages from the accused’s cell phone that he had 
attempted to delete after he was detained. The 
messages appeared to refer to the delivery of the box 
and arrangements to sell the cocaine.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused contended that the 
interception of the DHL box violated his 
s.  8 Charter right and the evidence 
obtained from the time the package was 
seized in Alberta should have been excluded under 
s.  24(2). The judge, however, dismissed this 
argument. He found that the  terms of the shipping 
contract specifically  authorized the initial inspection 
of the package and government agents to do the 
same. The judge ruled that the accused could not 
have a  greater expectation of privacy in the contents 
of the  box than the  man who sent it. “I cannot 
conclude that the consignee in these circumstances 
has greater privacy interests than the consignor, 
whose expectation of privacy, given the contractual 
term, was extremely  low, perhaps nonexistent given 
the terms of the contract,” said the judge. “Given 
these circumstances, I cannot conclude that [the 
accused’s] s.  8 rights were violated when the 
package was opened and turned over to the police 
in Calgary as he has little  or no expectation of 
privacy in that package.” Furthermore, even if there 
was a s.  8 breach, the judge would have admitted 
the evidence under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of possessing  controlled substances
(cocaine and MDMA) for the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused again claimed that the 
opening, and search and seizure  of 
the  package violated s.  8  and the 
evidence should have been 
excluded. In his opinion, the trial judge erred when 
he found the  police had not conducted an unlawful 
search and seizure when they took possession of the 
box from the DHL staff. The Crown took the position 
that the accused had no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a package 
sent to him by a third party who, by contract, had 
authorized the carrier and police to inspect the 
package. Since the police  did not intrude on any 
recognizable privacy interest of the accused, there 
was no search or seizure within the meaning of s. 8.  
Justice Goepel first outlined the principles 
underlying s. 8 of the Charter:
Section 8  of the Charter protects the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
To establish an infringement of s. 8, the person 
raising the claim must establish that he or she 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
thing searched or seized. A reasonable 
expectation of privacy is to be determined on the 
basis of the totality of the circumstances. 
The evaluation of any claim under s.  8  of the 
Charter involves two distinct inquiries. The first is 
whether the impugned state conduct intruded 
upon an applicant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy so as to constitute a search within the 
meaning of s. 8. The second is whether the state 
intrusion upon the applicant’s privacy was 
unreasonable. The second inquiry, namely 
whether the search was reasonable or justifiable, 
arises only if the first is answered in the 
affirmative. [references omitted, paras. 18-19]
To be afforded protection under s.  8, any claimed 
expectation of privacy must be objectively 
reasonable.
“To establish an infringement of s. 8, the person raising the claim must establish that he or she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing searched or seized. A reasonable expectation of 
privacy is to be determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances.”
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In this case, the shipping  contract authorized the 
inspection of the package by the courier company as 
well as government authorities. The Court of Appeal 
found the specific terms of the shipping  contract 
“negated any objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy that either [the sender] or the [accused] 
could assert.” Justice Goepel continued:
The recipient could not have a greater 
expectation of privacy than the sender. The fact 
that the [accused] may not have known of the 
terms of shipment does not make his subjective 
expectation objectively reasonable.
In the circumstances of this case there is no 
support for the [accused’s] assertion of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the package 
and its contents during the period between the 
delivery of the box to DHL and the controlled 
delivery to the [accused]. The police did not 
breach his constitutionally protected privacy 
rights by taking custody, from the shipping 
company, of an opened package that contained 
535 grams of cocaine shipped by a third party 
under a contract that expressly authorized both 
the carrier and the governmental authorities to 
open the package, because the [accused] had in 
the circumstances no such rights. [paras. 27-28]
Since the accused’s asserted privacy interest was not 
objectively reasonable, he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy and therefore there was no 
search or seizure within the meaning  of the Charter. 
Because there was no s. 8  breach, there was no need 
for a s. 24(2) analysis. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
INCIDENTAL	 PAT-DOWN	 
REASONABLE,	 BUT	 SEARCH	 OF	 
FLASH	 DRIVE	 NOT
R. v. Tuduce, 2014 ONCA 547
The police stopped the accused for 
speeding  at 10:22 am, arrested him 
for driving  with a suspended licence 
and patted him down for safety 
reasons. He was wearing  a large, 
puffy  winter coat and the officer placed his hands in 
the front pocket of the coat and pulled out a  small 
leather wallet, a USB key  (flash drive), and a bundle 
of credit cards held together with an elastic band.  
The officer noticed that the cards were not in the 
accused’s name, and that one of the cards was in a 
small manila envelope. He was placed in the rear of 
the police car and was allowed to call his mother to 
pick up  his vehicle. The officer returned to the SUV 
to turn off the ignition and roll up the window.  
While doing  so, he saw two Provincial Offences Act 
notices on the back seat and a dismantled cell 
phone, a SIM card, and a large number of credit 
card-sized manila envelopes in the front area. At that 
point, the  officer formed the belief that the cards 
found in the accused’s pocket were stolen, and he 
had sufficient grounds to make an arrest for 
possession of stolen credit cards. 
The officer returned to the police car, arrested the 
accused for credit card offences, handcuffed him, 
and took his cell phone and bundle of cards. When 
he returned to the SUV to seize the items he noticed 
earlier, he saw a green fabric box on the floor 
behind the driver’s seat. He could see a portion of an 
Ontario driver’s licence sticking  out of the box, 
removed it and found it was in someone else’s 
name. He also saw a saran-wrapped package, 
unwrapped it and found a number of small 
electronic parts that could be used to take 
information from the  magnetic  strip  of credit and 
debit cards. He also noticed several shopping  bags 
containing  computer cables and a credit card 
imprinter. The officer halted his search for safety 
reasons; cars were passing  at a high rate of speed 
near where he was standing.  The accused was taken 
to the police station, searched and six  more  SIM 
cards and a small electronics board were  located. 
His USB key was placed in his personal effects. At 
3:40 pm fraud squad detectives searched the 
vehicle, now stored at a towing  company, and 
seized the shopping  bags and their contents. They 
also decided to search the USB key that evening 
without a warrant, relying  on the power to search as 
an incident to arrest and believing  it could contain 
credit card data. The USB key was turned over to a 
police expert and a  week later a forensic analysis of 
the USB key was conducted. The USB key contained 
photographs of a  card reader and a circuit board 
used in skimming  devices. Text files containing 
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credit or debit card numbers followed by four digit 
Personal Identification Numbers and links to 
websites that offered pinhole  cameras and material 
used in skimming  devices, as well as instructions on 
how to make a magnetic strip card reader, were also 
found. The  accused was charged with several credit 
card related offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that the various 
searches breached his rights under s. 8 of 
the Charter and sought exclusion of all 
the evidence under s.24(2). The judge 
found there  were  four searches and all but one of 
them unreasonable:
1. Pat-down search at roadside.  This warrantless 
search was incidental to arrest for 
“an object that may be a threat to the 
safety of the police, the accused or 
the public, or that may facilitate 
escape or act as evidence against the 
accused”. Small items that could have been 
used as a weapon, such as a razor blade, could 
have been located in the wallet or the stack of 
credit cards. The judge held it was also 
reasonable for the officer to examine the 
contents of the wallet and read the names on 
the credit cards while he conducted his search. 
It was unrealistic to require a  police officer to 
refrain from examining  items that he locates 
during  the course of a  pat-down search for 
weapons.
2. Roadside search  of SUV.  The judge 
found that the officer did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the accused for possession of 
stolen credit cards based on his observation of 
the disassembled cell phone, the SIM card and 
the manila envelopes, which were located in 
the front seat of the SUV.   Since the credit card 
arrest was unlawful, the search of the SUV at 
the roadside and the  seizure of the cell phone, 
the SIM card and the manila envelopes from 
the front seat area was unreasonable.
3. Search of SUV after it was towed. 
Since the arrest was unlawful, this 
search of the SUV incidental to arrest 
was also unlawful.
4. Search of USB key.  The judge also 
found this search unlawful because 
the police power to search as an 
incident to arrest does not authorize 
the warrantless search of electronic devices, 
absent exigent circumstances. 
Despite these Charter breaches, the judge 
nonetheless admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), 
convicted the accused of seven credit card related 
offences and sentenced him to two years less a day 
in prison followed by two years’ probation. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in not finding 
t h e p a t - d o w n s e a r ch , a n d 
examination of his wallet and 
credit cards breached his s. 8  rights and in failing 
not to exclude all of the evidence under s. 24(2).  
Arrest & Pat-Down Search
Justice Gillese, authoring  the Court of Appeal 
decision, found both the arrest and pat-down lawful. 
First, Section 217(2)  of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act 
provides a broad discretion for an officer to arrest a 
person driving  with a  suspended driver’s licence on 
the standard of reasonable and probable grounds. In 
this case, the officer had the requisite justification for 
the arrest and properly exercised the power. Justice 
Gillese stated:
This is not a case where there was a complete 
absence of justification to arrest or where the 
arrest was made for an unlawful or improper 
purpose. The [accused] was the sole occupant of 
the SUV. He was speeding and driving with a 
suspended licence. Based on his record check, 
[the officer] knew that the [accused’s] licence 
had been suspended for a sufficient length of 
time that the [accused] would have received 
notice of the suspension by mail.  Had [the 
officer] issued a summons and left the [accused] 
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alone on the highway, it is entirely possible that 
the [accused] would have gotten back into his 
SUV and continued driving on the highway. [The 
officer] had the power to arrest, in the 
circumstances.  He detained the [accused] by 
placing  him in the back of his cruiser but did not 
handcuff the [accused], allowing him to contact 
a licenced driver to pick up the vehicles.  The 
power to arrest was not improperly exercised.  
The arrest was lawful. [para. 47]
Second, the pat-down search was also lawful. “A 
search incident to arrest may be carried out to 
ensure  the safety of the police and the public, to 
protect evidence from destruction, 
or to discover evidence that can be 
used at trial,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “[The officer] believed, and 
in the circumstances had a 
reasonable basis for believing, that 
a protective  pat-down search would 
serve  the purpose of ensuring 
officer safety; he was therefore 
entitled to engage in such a 
search.” The officer testified he 
conducted the search for safety 
reasons relating  to both himself and 
the accused. He was working  alone on a busy 
highway and knew that he  would be placing  the 
accused in the back of his police cruiser without 
handcuffs.  
Furthermore, the trial judge did not err in 
concluding  the pat-down search did not go too far 
when the officer checked the accused’s wallet and 
package of cards:  
[The officer] testified that he carried out the 
search incident to arrest for safety reasons.  
Although he did not testify directly that the same 
reasoning  applied to his search of the wallet and 
cards, the trial judge appears to have accepted 
[the officer’s] testimony as extending  to the 
search of the wallet and stack of credit cards.  
The trial judge stated that it is possible for a 
small item, such as a razor blade, to be located 
in a wallet or among a stack of credit cards.  
Accordingly, the trial judge said, it was 
“unrealistic” to expect the officer to have 
refrained from examining  those items located in 
the [accused’s] coat pockets in the course of a 
pat-down search for weapons. 
The trial judge made these findings in the 
context of a pat-down search that had been 
conducted in a reasonable manner.  [The officer] 
patted down the [accused’s] waistband and the 
pockets of his jeans.  The [accused] was wearing 
a large, puffy winter coat.  [The officer] reached 
into the front pockets of the coat and removed a 
wallet, USB key and package of cards bound 
together by an elastic band.  He 
did not remove other items from 
the pockets and he did not ask 
the [accused] to remove any 
clothing for closer inspection. 
As for [the officer’s] observation 
of the names on the cards, I do 
not see how [the officer] could 
have checked the package of 
cards for possible weapons 
without looking  at the cards and, 
in doing  so, noticing  the names 
recorded on them. [paras. 52-54]
Since the pat-down search was valid, s. 24(2)  did not 
apply to the evidence obtained from this search . 
Exclusion of Evidence 
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
claim that the trial judge made an error in not 
excluding  the evidence obtained from the SUV and 
USB key searches. Using  the three part s. 24(2) 
analysis regarding  (i)  the  seriousness of the Charter-
infringing  conduct, (ii) the impact of the breach on 
the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and 
(iii)  society’s interest in adjudication of the case on 
its merits, Justice Gillese found the evidence 
admissible. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“A search incident to arrest may be carried out to ensure the safety of the police and the 
public, to protect evidence from destruction, or to discover evidence that can be used at trial.”
“[The officer] believed, and 
in the circumstances had a 
reasonable basis for 
believing, that a protective 
pat-down search would serve 
the purpose of ensuring 
officer safety; he was 
therefore entitled to engage 
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2014 BRITISH COLUMBIA 
LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL
Friday, September 26 to Sunday, September 28, 2014
On Sunday, September 28, 2014 law enforcement officers from across British Columbia and northwest Washington 
State will meet at Abbotsford’s Rotary Stadium at Exhibition Park to honour our fallen comrades who made the 
ultimate sacrifice while serving the citizens of the province of British Columbia.
On September 24, 1998, the Government of Canada officially  proclaimed the last Sunday of September of every 
year as Police and Peace Officers' National Memorial Day. The Solicitor 
General of Canada stated that "a formal, national Memorial Day gives 
Canadians an opportunity  each year to formally  express appreciation for 
thededication of Police and Peace Officers, who make the ultimate, tragic 
sacrifice to keep communities safe." Law Enforcement Officers from all over 
Canada gather in Ottawa and march to the Police and Peace Officers' 
Memorial Pavilion on Parliament Hill, where all fallen Officers are remembered 
and their sacrifices honoured.
The British Columbia Law Enforcement Memorial coincides with the National Police & Peace 
Officers’ Memorial held in Ottawa and alternates annually between the site of “The Bastion” on 
the grounds of the BC Legislature in Victoria and the Lower Mainland. The Bastion, a 
Provincial Monument dedicated to those officers who lost their lives in active service to the 
citizens of BC, was unveiled in September 2004 by  Premier Gordon Campbell, Solicitor 
General Rich Coleman and Mr. and Mrs. Ng, representing a "Fallen Hero Family" at the annual 
Memorial event.
On behalf of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP), the British Columbia 
Police Association and the organizing committee representing all BC Law Enforcement agencies we would like to 
invite all peace officers and citizens to join us on this last Sunday  in September in honouring our fallen comrades 
and supporting their surviving family members.
Host Agencies & Organizing Committee
The Abbotsford Police Department and Langley RCMP Detachment are honoured to host this year’s Memorial event 
together with committee members representing: BC  Sheriff Service; Canada Border Service Agency; City of 
Abbotsford – Parks, Recreation & Culture; Commercial Vehicle Safety  & Enforcement; Conservation Service of BC; 
Correctional Service of BC; Correctional Service of Canada; CP Police Service; Delta Police Department; E Division 
RCMP; Police & Peace Officers' Memorial Ribbon Society; and Vancouver Police Department.
2014 MEMORIAL WEEKEND OVERVIEW
Friday, September 26, 2014
✦ 1st Annual Memorial Golf Tournament
• Ledgeview Golf & Country Club in Abbotsford
• Texas Scramble, best-ball format / Inter-agency competition
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Saturday, September 27, 2014
✦ Memorial Bike Ride
✦ Master Workout Class
• formats Zumba, Bootcamp, Yoga
✦ BC Law Enforcement Memorial Mess Dinner
• To be held at Abbotsford Centre 
• Event open to law enforcement officers only
Sunday, September 28, 2014
✦ BC Law Enforcement Memorial
• Rotary Stadium, Exhibition Park, Abbotsford 
✦ Memorial Reception
• Ag-Rec Building, Exhibition Park, Abbotsford
PARKING
Participants may park at: 
• Exhibition Park – lower lot north of Rotary Stadium (32470 Haida Drive) 
• Abbotsford City Hall parking lots (Trethewey Street at Veterans Way) 
• Mouat Secondary High School (32355 Mouat Drive)
TRANSPORTATION
All Law Enforcement agencies will be responsible for providing their own transportation to Abbotsford.
PARADE ORDERS
The parade will form up on Thunderbird Memorial Square on Veterans Way in Abbotsford (behind City Hall) at 1130 
hrs. Colour Party and Rifle Escorts will be leading; with Pipe Bands leading each company. The senior officers 
shall also be positioned in front of their respective units. Sergeant Major’s Briefing - will be held on the Sunday 
morning at Abbotsford Police Headquarters (2838 Justice Way) at 1100 hrs. The Parade will STEP OFF at 1215 
hrs.  The Memorial Service will be conducted followed by a march past of the Review Party and surviving family 
members of the fallen.
ORDER OF DRESS
Members shall wear the order of dress as established by their respective agencies. Headdress will remain ON for 
the entire service.
MOTORCYCLES
Motorcycles will line up in the parking lot west of The Reach Gallery at 32388 Veterans Way, Abbotsford.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICE DOGS
Service Dogs and their handlers will march behind the company of their home agency.
RECEPTION
Following the parade a reception will be held at the Air Cadet Building, Exhibition Park until 1600 hrs. Finger foods, 
coffee and water will be provided. At 1600 hrs the doors of The Rancho (35110 Delair Road, Abbotsford) will be 
opened.
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BRI T ISH C O L U M BI A  
L A W E N F O R C E M E N T M E M O RI A L 
C O L L E C T O R C O IN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coins are $10 each 
 
Net proceeds will be donated to: 
British Columbia Law Enforcement Memorial Foundation 
& 
3ROLFH	3HDFH2IILFHUV¶0HPRULDO5LEERQ6RFLHW\ 
The front of the coin depicts a Federal 
and Municipal officer standing post at the 
B ritish Columbia Law Enforcement 
Memorial Bastion located on the grounds 
of the Provincial Legislature in V ictoria; 
with the flag of British Columbia in the 
background. 
The back of the coin depicts officers from 
Federal, Provincial and Municipal 
agencies fir ing a rifle salute with the 
Memorial Ribbon in the background. The 
phrase around the border is etched into 
the Bastion. 
Volume 14 Issue 1 - January/February 2014
15-006
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options.  
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca  
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certi!cate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certi!cates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
